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McBRIETY v. PHILLIPS

PARTNERSHIP BY ESTOPPEL BASED ON A HOLDING
OUT WITH KNOWLEDGE OF, BUT WITHOUT
CONSENT OF, THE PARTY TO BE CHARGED
McBriety, et al., v. Phillips, et al.'
This was an action by the plaintiffs, wholesalers of
beer and ale, against the defendants, X and Y, allegedly
doing business as a partnership under the name Cozy Spot,
to recover the price of beer and ale delivered on credit.
The apparently active partner, Y, went bankrupt before
the commencement of the suit, and X denied that he had
ever been in partnership with Y. While the case involved
a favorable ruling as to whether X's denial was appropriately pleaded, the main issue was whether there was any
evidence legally sufficient to show that X was a partner.
The trial court had directed a verdict in favor of X. The
Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial, reasoning that the evidence admitted, plus certain evidence
wrongfully excluded, was sufficient to justify submission
of the case to the jury to determine whether a partnership
existed in fact or by estoppel.
While the purpose of all the excluded evidence is not
clear, it would seem that the evidence in its entirety could
have been taken to establish that X financed the enterprise
and directed Y to run it as his manager, or at least that X
consented to representations as to his interest in the business; and that the plaintiffs issued credit in reliance on
this. The details of the rulings on the evidence, however,
are not material to this note, which is directed solely to
the Court's statement with reference to the doctrine of
partnership by estoppel. The Court said:
"The principle of law is firmly established that a
person, even though not a partner in fact, is liable
as a partner to those persons who deal in good faith
with the firm or with him as a member of it with the
reasonable belief that he is a member of the firm, provided that he so holds himself out to such persons or
the public, or is so held out by his authority or with
his knowledge and assent, and credit is to some extent
induced by this belief. The doctrine of partnership
by estoppel is founded upon principles of justice for
the purpose of preventing fraud. When a person has
induced others to believe that he is a partner and to
126 A. (2d) 400 (Md., 1942).
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extend credit to the partnership by reason of such
belief, he should not be permitted to deny that participation which he has asserted or permitted to appear to
exist, even though not existing in fact. Thomas v.
Green, 30 Md. 1; Fletcher v. Pullen, 70 Md. 205, 16 A.
887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 355; Lighthiser v. Alison, 100 Md.
103, 59 A. 182; West v. Driscoll, 142 Md. 205, 120 A. 445
The statute provides that when a person consents to
be represented in a public manner as a partner, he is
liable to any person who gives credit on the faith of
such representation, even though the representation
is communicated to the creditor without the apparent
partner's knowledge. Acts of 1916, ch. 175, Code, art.
73A, § 16. In order to invoke the doctrine of estoppel,
it must be shown that the creditor acted in reliance
upon the representations at the time he entered into
the transaction. Thompson v. First National Bank of
Toledo, 111 U. S. 529, 4 S. Ct. 689, 28 L. Ed. 507; 3 Page
on Contracts, §§ 1706, 1707, 1708. If a person knows
that he is held out as a partner by another, he is just
as liable as though he had called himself a partner,
unless he does all that a reasonable and honest man
would do under similar circumstances to assert his
denial in order to remove the impression and prevent
innocent parties from being misled. Fletcher v. Pullen, 70 Md. 205, 215, 16 A. 887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 355;
Parsons on Partnership,3rd Ed., 146."
The reason this language evokes comment is that it is
the first pronouncement of the Court of Appeals on the
doctrine of partnership by estoppel since the case of Brocato v. Serio,2 which called forth a comment 8 in this
REVIEW seeking clarification of the Maryland law as to
when mere knowledge of the party to be bound that he
was being represented as a partner would bind him as a
partner by estoppel. In that comment it was observed
that the wording of Section 16 of the Uniform Partnership
Act as adopted in Maryland,4 was meant to repudiate the
so-called minority rule of Fletcher v. Pullen5 that mere
knowledge was enough, and to adopt the view that consent
to the representations was necessary, with this consent
left as a matter of fact for the jury.
Md. 374, 196 A. 125 (1937), noted (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 189.
8Ibid.
'Md. Code (1939) Art. 73A, Sec. 16.
70 Md. 205, 16 A. 887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 355 (1889).
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It is questionable if the language of the instant opinion
clarifies the problem in its reference with approval to both
Section 16 of the Uniform Act requiring consent, and to
the doctrine of Fletcher v. Pullen that knowledge is
enough. This is particularly open to criticism if it occurs
without reflection on the problem or without an awareness
of the possible interpretation of Fletcher v. Pullen that
mere knowledge is enough in all cases unless the party to
be bound takes active steps to prevent representations
of his being a partner.'
If, however, the Court is aware of the intention of the
Uniform Act7 to bind a silent person only if he has consented to representations that he is a partner, but is insisting that there may be circumstances under which knowledge of his being held out as a partner without doing anything at all to repudiate it may amount to such consent (is
evidence of it), and that this is the correct interpretation
of both Fletcher v. Pullen and the Uniform Act, its citation of both with approval is understandable. It may be
that such an interpretation would do no injustice to the
intention of the Commissioners or to the language of the
Act. For, if consent is a question of fact for the jury,
there well might be certain circumstances where knowledge of repeated representations of his partnership, coupled
with his complete inaction, might be taken to amount to
consent to such representations by the party to be bound,'
just as there might be other situations where mere knowledge would not be enough. At least, no great injustice
would seem to come from such an approach, and it is to be
hoped that this is the correct explanation of the Court's
repeated reference to the language of Fletcher v. Pullen as
applicable since the passage of the Uniform Partnership
Act.
o See such interpretation of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in
the note (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 189, 192, 193. It is questionable if Fletcher
v. Pullen, or its citations, were ever meant to express a doctrine as broad
as the minority view disapproved by the Commissioners. See infra, n. 8.
Supra, n. 4.
'This would be quite different from the minority view as stated by the
Commissioners in their notes to Section 16, subdivision 1-B (see reference
supra, n. 6), for which they cited Fletcher v. Pullen, when they said "it
has been held that a person is liable if he has been held out as a partner
and knows that he is being held out, unless he prevents such holding out,
if to do so he has to take legal action."

